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Abstract    Demographic risk—the risk that mortality laws change in a 
nondeterministic way—and its implications for corporate decisions has re-
cently been the subject of lively scientific discussion. We show that demo-
graphic risk is also a key determinant for individual annuitization decisions. 
Demographic risk appears to be a sticky, i.e., hardly transferable, risk. 
Whether its existence leads to a higher or lower annuity demand depends on 
objective factors (e.g., insurers’ vulnerability to demographic shocks). Subjec-
tive factors (i.e., individuals’ preferences) determine only the intensity of the 
annuity demand reaction to demographic risk. Our results are of significant 
importance not only for financial planning approaches of individual annuity 
buyers, but also for strategic decisions in insurance companies and for 
solvency regulators. Furthermore, consideration of demographic risk may both 
alleviate, but also intensify, the annuity puzzle. 
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Introduction 
 
Initiated by Yaari’s seminal work, the study of optimal individual annuitiza-
tion decisions became of increasing interest in the economics literature. Yaari 
(1965) showed that, in a perfect market setting, expected utility maximizers 
with no utility of bequest would manage the uncertainty regarding their life-
time by annuitizing their entire wealth. Under more general assumptions on 
utility functions, this result was recently confirmed by Davidoff, Brown, and 
Diamond (2005). Empirical studies find, however, that only a small portion of 
private wealth is used to purchase annuities. Several theoretical and empirical 
posited explanations to explain this “annuity puzzle”, e.g.: 
 
  due to adverse selection and transaction costs, annuities are unfairly priced 
(Friedman and Warshawsky, 1988; Mitchell et al., 1999); 
  constant annuity payouts in combination with borrowing and short-selling 
constraints may induce a suboptimal consumption profile (Brown, 2001); 
  the existence of bequest motives (Yaari, 1965); 
  the crowding-out effect of government pensions (Mitchell et al., 1999; 
Brown and Poterba, 2000); 
  intra-family risk sharing (Kotlikoff and Spivak, 1981; Post, Gründl, and 
Schmeiser, 2006); and 
  default-risk of the annuity providing insurer (Babbel and Merrill, 2006). 
 
This paper provides a normative analysis of the impact of demographic risk—
which is also called stochastic mortality (e.g., Cairns, Blake, and Dowd, 2006) 
or aggregate mortality risk (e.g., Brown and Orszag, 2006)—on individual 
annuity demand. Demographic risk refers to the fact that mortality laws and 
life tables describing lifetime uncertainty may change in a nondeterministic 
way (see Olivieri, 2001; Cairns, Blake, and Dowd, 2006; Brown and Orszag, 
2006). Such unexpected changes in mortality may result from, e.g., medical 
innovations (leading to lower mortality rates, see, e.g., Hayflick, 2000; Held, 
2002; Olshansky, Hayflick, and Carnes, 2002) or increased occurrence of very 
hot summers—comparable to the 2003 and 2006 summers in Europe—as a 
consequence of a global climate change (on hot summers leading to higher 
mortality rates, see Valleron and Boumendil, 2004; Conti et al., 2005). The 
importance of demographic risk for insurance company risk management  
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decisions has been highlighted in recent publications (see, e.g., Lin and Cox, 
2005; Cowley and Cummins, 2005; Cairns, Blake, and Dowd, 2006; Gründl, 
Post, and Schulze, 2006; Brown and Orszag, 2006). We show that 
demographic risk is also a key determinant in individual risk management, 
especially for annuitization decisions. 
 
Our investigation utilizes an intertemporal expected utility framework with 
borrowing and short-selling constraints and uninsurable government pension 
income risk. The risk-averse individual must optimize decisions regarding 
consumption, saving, and how to allocate savings between a risky asset, a risk 
free asset, and annuities. In accordance with Olivieri (2001) and Gründl, Post, 
and Schulze (2006), demographic risk is modeled as a mean-preserving shock 
on future survival probabilities. 
 
We show that demographic risk does not influence optimal decisions if it is 
stochastically independent of other sources of the individual’s income risk. 
We make clear that this is a direct consequence of the preference assumptions 
under which optimal decisions are derived. This result is in accordance with 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) in the context of informational asymmetry, and 
also with Franke, Schlesinger, and Stapleton (2005, 2005a) in the context of—
amongst other—tax uncertainty. 
 
However, for most individuals, demographic risk will not be independent from 
other sources of income risk. For example, Gründl, Post, and Schulze (2006) 
made clear that the solvency situation of an annuity-providing life insurer is 
strongly influenced by demographic risk. Depending on the structure of the 
life insurer’s contract portfolio and asset allocation, mortality shocks can lead 
to an at least partial insurer default, thus linking the distribution of effective 
annuity payments to demographic risk.
1 Furthermore, government pension 
payments—especially pay-as-you-go systems—may depend on demographic 
developments.
2 Also, the insurer’s investment in the risky asset influences its 
                                                 
1   For a general analysis of the influence of an insurer's default risk on annuity demand, see 
Babbel and Merrill (2006). 
2   For example, a positive shock on survival rates means that—ceteris paribus—a greater 
number of retirees will have to be paid out of a given amount of social security taxes. 
Thus, the average pension must shrink. For further analyses, see, e.g., Aaron (1966) or  
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solvency situation. Thus, the performance of the risky asset influences the 
distribution of effective annuity payments. Finally, the performance of the in-
dividual’s investment in the risky asset might negatively depend on the devel-
opment of future survival rates (“asset meltdown”).
3 
 
After integrating these dependencies into our framework, the individual’s op-
timal decisions become highly dependent on demographic risk. We show that 
whether or not demographic risk leads to an increase in individuals’ annuity 
demand is determined by objective factors (such as the exposure of govern-
ment pensions and/or the insurance industry to demographic shocks). Subjec-
tive factors (such as individuals’ risk aversion) determine only the intensity of 
the annuity demand reaction with respect to demographic risk. We find that—
depending on the model parameters—consideration of demographic risk may 
both alleviate, but also intensify, the annuity puzzle. 
 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 1, we first formalize our model. 
As the model will be analytically tractable only under very restrictive assump-
tions, we next calibrate the model parameters in order to perform further 
analyses numerically. Our results are presented in Section 2 and policy impli-
cations are derived. Section 3 summarizes. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Kotlikoff (1979). Ongoing reforms of the German government pension system provide a 
recent example for such a demographically driven reduction of pension payments (see, 
e.g., Börsch-Supan and Wilke, 2004). 
3   The asset meltdown hypothesis is motivated by the idea that an increase in survival rates 
results in a greater number of retirees. Besides the general argument that an “older” 
society is said to be less innovative and productive, increased pension obligations of 
business firms may have an adverse effect on their financial performances (Bakshi and 
Chen, 1994). That demographic variables may have an effect on asset prices, and the 
direction of this effect is not unequivocally accepted in the literature. For further dis-
cussion, see, e.g., Bakshi and Chen (1994); Abel (2001, 2003); Poterba (2001); Brooks 
(2002).  
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1 The Model
4 
1.1 Formalization 
 
We consider a two-period framework. Let w1 denote the individual’s known 
initial wealth in period 1, and ci ≥ 0, i = 1, 2, the individual’s nominal con-
sumption in period i. Denoting by u the individual’s one-period utility function 
with respect to a real monetary argument (period consumption), we assume 
that from the perspective of period 1, the individual evaluates total two-period 
utility additively separably by 
 
  u (c1) + β ⋅ IInd ⋅ u(c2 ⋅ δ), (1)
 
where IInd is a Bernoulli-distributed random indicator variable with success 
probability  p taking value 1 if the individual survives (so that p is the 
individual’s survival probability), and value 0 if the individual dies before 
period 2 (implying that there are no bequest motives). We assume that p is 
representative for the whole population and subject to demographic risk. 
Similarly, as done by Olivieri (2001) and Gründl, Post, and Schulze (2006), 
we model demographic risk as a symmetrically distributed additive deviation 
∆p from individuals’ mean survival probability p0. Thus, the survival 
probability p is random and given by p = p0 + ∆p. By β ∈ (0, 1) we denote the 
individual’s subjective discount factor (expressing time preference) and 
δ > 0  is the one-period monetary deflator. 
 
Let sR and sf be the amounts of money the individual invests in a risky and a 
risk free asset in period 1, providing him with a risky return of sR ⋅ R and a risk 
free return of sf ⋅ rf in period 2, respectively. We assume both sR and sf to be 
nonnegative, implying that the individual is not allowed to either short-sell the 
risky asset or go into debt. We further assume that the individual can decide to 
put some money π ≥ 0 into a life annuity, providing him with an annuity pay-
ment in period 2 given he survives until period 2, i.e., if IInd realizes as 1. Total 
savings, i.e., sR + sf + π, will henceforth be denoted as S. 
 
                                                 
4   We summarize the model parameters and their calibrations in Table 3 at the end of this 
section.  
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Let us assume that the annuity payment in period 2 is subject to the default 
risk of the insurance company having sold the contract and that in the case of 
ruin, the individual receives only a fraction ψ ∈ [0, 1] of every € of the 
agreed-upon survival benefit (depending, of course, on the premium π). We 
can understand ψ as the fraction of the claims against the insurer that can be 
recovered by some guarantee fund. Let us denote by d(r,ϕ) ∈ [0, 1] the in-
surer’s ruin probability given realizations r and ϕ  of R and ∆p. With respect to 
the influences of the actual outcomes of R and ∆p, we require that the first de-
rivative of d with respect to its first argument is negative, while the sign of the 
first derivative of d with respect to its second argument is positive. The first 
assumption implies that the insurer’s ruin probability is the higher the poorer 
is the performance of the risky asset. This is plausible since risky assets usu-
ally make up a significant part of an insurer’s asset portfolio. The second as-
sumption implies that the insurer has underwritten more annuity than term-life 
business.
5 In case the derivative of d with respect to its second argument is 
equal to zero, the insurer’s solvency situation appears to be immune to demo-
graphic shocks. 
 
Note that while the ruin probability d is an indicator of the insurer’s idiosyn-
cratic risk of payment default, the default pay-off fraction ψ  may be inter-
preted as an indication of the unprotected exposure of the whole insurance 
industry to systematic risks such as asset return risk and, especially, demo-
graphic risk. If ψ is very low, exposure to systematic risks is very high (which 
could be the case if the guarantee fund is insufficiently funded to provide ade-
quate cover against systematic risks that hit many life insurers at the same 
time). On the contrary, a high ψ may mean that there is a reliable guarantor to 
support the insurance industry in case of a systematic default. 
 
                                                 
5   As discussed by Gründl, Post, and Schulze (2006), the actual dependency of the insurer’s 
ruin probability on demographic shocks depends on the insurer’s underwriting policy. For 
example, if the insurer holds a liability portfolio that mostly consists of annuity contracts, 
the relationship between d and ∆p should be positive, whereas for an insurer that mostly 
sold term-life insurance contracts, natural hedging effects lead to a negative relationship. 
Furthermore, an insurer may hold mortality derivatives (see, e.g., Cowley and Cummins, 
2005). In that case, the insurer’s vulnerability to demographic risk depends on the degree 
of coverage and the basis risk of these instruments (see Blake, Cairns, and Dowd, 2006).  
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Let us further denote by A ≥ 0 the actuarially fair survival payment of the an-
nuity. Accounting for the insurer’s possible ruin and assuming symmetric be-
liefs between the individual and the insurer regarding survival probability dis-
tributions and, as in Doherty and Schlesinger (1990), the insurer’s ruin prob-
ability,
6 for a given ruin probability d and a given survival probability p, the 
actuarially fair survival payment A is determined via the pricing formula 
 
  π  = rf 
–1 ⋅ p ⋅ [(1 – d) ⋅ A + d ⋅ ψ ⋅ A]. (2)
 
Thus the annuity price is the higher the lower the insurer’s ruin probability and 
the higher the default pay-off fraction is, i.e., the annuity price increases as 
product quality increases (Doherty and Schlesinger, 1990). Rearranging and 
now accounting for the stochastic character of the arguments of d, and p itself, 
we achieve for the actuarially fair survival payment 
 
   ()
() ( ) ( ) 0 11 , d ( , )
f r
A
pd r F r
π
π
ϕ ψϕ ϕ
⋅
=
+− − ⋅ ⋅   ∫∫
  (3)
 
where F denotes the joint distribution function of R and ∆p. The fair survival 
payment A thus depends—beyond the individual’s decision on π—on the de-
fault pay-off fraction ψ and on the joint distribution of the risky asset return R 
and the survival probability shock ∆p. To implement premium loadings, let us 
further introduce the parameter λ ∈ [0, 1]. Instead of the fair amounts A(π) 
and ψ ⋅ A(π) that are paid out depending on the insurer’s solvency situation, 
only λ ⋅ A(π) and λ ⋅ ψ ⋅ A(π) are paid out. A certain value for λ thus stands for 
a percentage premium loading of (1 – λ )/λ · 100%. 
 
If  IIns is a Bernoulli-distributed indicator variable with success probability   
1 – d(r,ϕ)  for given realizations r and ϕ of R and ∆p (i.e., which is 0 if the 
insurer defaults and is 1 if it does not), we can write the effective annuity 
payment, let us call it L(π), the individual receives given he survives until pe-
riod 2 as 
 
                                                 
6   For an analysis of asymmetric information about the ruin probability, see Cummins and 
Mahul (2003).  
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   ( ) ( ) ( ) 1 Ins Ins LA I I π λπ ψ =⋅ ⋅ +− ⋅     (4)
 
which is conditionally (on the realization of d) binarily distributed and purely 
random as soon as ψ > 0 and d(r,ϕ) > 0. Unconditionally, also the success 
probability of IIns is random, which transfers to L, too, so that L(π) in Equation 
(4) actually should be written as L(π | R = r, ∆p = ϕ). 
 
Additionally, for a given realization ϕ of ∆p, let Y(ϕ) denote the individual’s 
income from the pay-as-you-go government pension system receivable in pe-
riod 2, given the individual is alive then. Since pay-as-you-go pension systems 
strongly depend on the development of demographic variables (see, e.g., 
Aaron, 1966; Kotlikoff, 1979), we assume that Y’(ϕ) ≤ 0, which means that an 
increase (decrease) in the general and individual survival probability will lead 
to an immediate drop (rise) or constancy in the pension payment.
7 
 
The individual’s (from the perspective of period 1) random consumption in 
period 2 is thus given by 
 
  c 2 = sR ⋅ R + sf  ⋅ rf + L(π) + Y, (5)
 
where sR,, sf,, and π, together with first period consumption c1, are linked by 
the budget constraint w1 = c1 + sR + sf  + π, and each of these four decision vari-
ables is subject to its nonnegativity constraint. The individual’s evaluation of 
total utility is thus given by 
 
  u (c1) + β ⋅ IInd ⋅ u(( sR ⋅ R + sf  ⋅ rf + L(π) + Y ) ⋅ δ ) (6)
 
which, of course, is also random. To determine optimal decisions on con-
sumption, investment, and annuity purchase, we assume that the individual 
maximizes the expected value of total utility, which is given by 
 
                                                 
7   See Gomes, Kotlikoff, and Viceira (2006) for a model that analyzes the welfare effects of 
government indecision, i.e., a case where the government tries to procrastinate the 
announcement of bad news on retirement benefits.   
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,d ( , ) , Rf f
uc p
usrsr L Rrp Y F r
βϕ
π ϕϕ δ ϕ
+⋅ + ⋅
 ⋅⋅ + ⋅ + = ∆ = + ⋅ 
∫∫
 
 (7)
 
with respect to  c1, sR, sf , and π , subject to w1 = c1 + sR + sf  + π and c1, sR, sf , 
π ≥ 0.  
 
Due to the complexity of the interrelations of influencing factors in the model 
and due to the no-short-selling and borrowing constraints, most of the calcula-
tions necessary to perform our analyses are not analytically tractable. We 
therefore determine optimal solutions numerically, making it necessary to first 
calibrate our model. 
 
 
1.2 Calibration 
 
In this section, we define the base values assigned to our model parameters. 
Section 2.3 contains a thorough analysis of the consequences different values 
would have. 
 
To express the individual’s intratemporal risk preferences, we use a utility 
function with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), given by parameter 
γ > 0. Thus for c > 0, we have u(c) = c
 (1 – γ) / (1 – γ). The parameter of constant 
relative risk aversion γ  is set to 3; the intertemporal subjective discount factor 
β is set to 0.95 (see, e.g., Laibson, Repetto, and Tobacman, 1998). For the in-
dividual’s initial wealth, we set w1 = 100. 
 
To model demographic risk, we use three-point distributions as done in 
Gründl, Post, and Schulze (2006). For the state space of ∆p, we set   
(– 0.01, 0, + 0.01), which means that the individual’s survival probability—
starting from p0—will either increase by 1 percentage point, stay constant, or 
drop by 1 percentage point. Onto the set of measurable subsets of this state 
space, we set five alternative probability measures, which we choose as done 
in Gründl, Post, and Schulze (2006). Table 1 contains the probability 
distributions used.  
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Table 1 Probability distributions of ∆p 
 
  probability that ∆p is 
probability 
distri-
bution 
– 0.01  
(decrease in survival 
probability) 
0  
(no demographic 
shock) 
+ 0.01 
(increase in survival 
probability) 
1  0.000 1.000 0.000 
2  0.025 0.950 0.025 
3  0.050 0.900 0.050 
4  0.100 0.800 0.100 
5  0.200 0.600 0.200 
 
In all distributions, the main probability mass—depending on the probability 
model, between 60% and 100%—is assigned to the state of nature where ∆p 
realizes as 0, i.e., if E(p) = p0 turns out to be the individual’s actual survival 
probability. The remaining mass is then assigned equally to the “deviating” 
states of nature, where the individual’s survival probability realizes as   
p0 – 0.01 or p0 + 0.01, respectively. For the mean survival probability we set  
p0 = 0.85. 
 
The one-period return of the risk free asset is set to rf = 1.05, which is the 
sample mean of the annualized return time series of the German money market 
from 1950 to 2003 (see Gründl, Post, and Schulze, 2006). The one-period de-
flator δ is set to 0.9744, which is the inverse of the mean inflation rate given 
by the German consumer price index (CPI) between 1950 and 2003, which is 
about 1.0263. 
 
For the return R of the risky asset we initially (Sections 2.1 and 2.2.1) assume 
that its conditional distribution given any realization of the demographic shock 
is normal with mean of 1.1567 and standard deviation of 0.3192, implying 
stochastical independence between R and ∆p.
8 Introducing the asset meltdown 
hypothesis into our model (Section 2.2.2), we then drop this independence 
assumption, and instead assume the distribution of the risky return to be nega-
                                                 
8   These values were also taken from Gründl, Post, and Schulze (2006). They were 
estimated from a time series (1950 to 2003) of the German stock market index DAX.  
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tively correlated with the demographic shock.
9 We model this assuming, 
again, that conditional distributions of R given a realization of ∆p are normal. 
Keeping conditional standard deviations constant at the level used before, i.e., 
at 0.3192, we now, however, model conditional expected returns to depend on 
the actual realization of ∆p. We do this by assuming that the conditional ex-
pectation of R decreases by 2 percentage points to 1.1367 if ∆p realizes as 
+ 0.01 (i.e., improvement of the survival probability leads rather to a drop in 
asset returns) and increases to 1.1767 if ∆p realizes as – 0.01. Table 2 summa-
rizes the possible conditional probability distributions of R.
10 
 
Table 2 Probability distributions of risky return R 
 
  distribution of R conditional on realization ϕ of ∆p in case of 
ϕ  independence of R and ∆p 
negative dependence of R and ∆p
(asset meltdown) 
– 0.01  N(1.1567, 0.3192) N(1.1767,  0.3192) 
0 N(1.1567,  0.3192)  N(1.1567, 0.3192) 
+ 0.01  N(1.1567, 0.3192) N(1.1367,  0.3192) 
 
To model the insurer’s ruin probability d(r,ϕ) for every pair of realizations 
(r,ϕ) of (R,∆p), we choose the log-linear functional form 
 
  d (r,ϕ) = exp(α∆p⋅ ϕ + αR ⋅ r + const),  (8)
 
where α∆p and αR determine the degree of reaction of the insurer’s ruin prob-
ability to the demographic scenario and the performance of the risky asset. 
From the partial derivative conditions above, we require α∆p and αR to be non-
negative and nonpositive, respectively. In cases where the insurer’s ruin prob-
ability is not dependent on demographic risk or the performance of the risky 
asset, the respective reaction parameters are set to 0. Besides the natural re-
quirement 0 ≤ d(r,ϕ) ≤ 1, for every pair of realizations (r,ϕ) of (R,∆p), we ad-
                                                 
9   See footnote 2.  
10   Dependence between capital market return and survival probability actually would 
require a risk adjustment in the discount factor when calculating the fair annuity premium 
in Formula (2). For the sake of facilitating comparative statics, however, we refrain from 
that.  
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ditionally impose the restrictions that, first, if R realizes below the 0.1%-per-
centile of the risky asset return distribution and at the same time ∆p realizes as 
0 (no survival probability shift), the insurer’s ruin probability is equal to 3%; 
and that, second, every ruin probability induced by a realization of R increases 
(decreases) tenfold if ∆p realized as + 0.01 (– 0.01), i.e., if there is an increase 
(decrease) in the survival probability. In the—with respect to the insurer’s sol-
vency situation—worst case of an asset return below about 0.126 (i.e., a loss 
of 87.4%) and an increase in the survival probability, the insurer will fail to 
meet the individual’s annuity payment claims with a probability of 30%. In 
cases where R realizes at the other end of its support, and demographic risk 
realizes as a reduction in survival probability, the insurer’s ruin probability is 
approximately 0.
11 For the unconditional (expected) ruin probability 
E[d(R,∆p)] (i.e., the a priori ruin probability of the insurer from the 
perspective of period 1), we assume that it coincides with some regulator-fixed 
maximum ruin probability (this is why we need the fitting variable const in 
Equation (8)). As done in Gründl, Post, and Schulze (2006), we set the 
insurer’s maximum unconditional ruin probability to 0.01, i.e., 1%. 
 
We set the default pay-off fraction ψ alternatively to 0 and 0.6. The loading 
factor λ is set to 0.9, leading to a loading of 1/9 ⋅ π . For the payment from the 
government pay-as-you-go pension system in period 2, we assume as true the 
functional relationship 
 
  Y (ϕ) = w1 ⋅ ϑ  ⋅  (1 − αY ⋅ ϕ)  (9)
 
where the parameter αY ≥ 0 determines the degree of reaction of the govern-
ment pension payment on a given realization ϕ of the demographic shock ∆p. 
The parameter ϑ  ≥ 0 is some pension factor determining the fraction of initial 
wealth the individual expects to receive as government pension in period 2.
12 
A positive demographic shock on the individual’s survival probability will 
                                                 
11  Of course, this calibration is to some extent arbitrary. We checked the consequences of 
changes in these two assumptions (3% and tenfold increase/decrease) and found 
robustness of the tendencies of our results. 
12  By doing this, the CRRA feature of the one-period utility function makes our results 
arbitrarily scaleable in the period 1 wealth-to-pension factor ratio; see Pratt (1964) and 
Carroll (2004).  
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thus lead to a proportional drop in the individual’s pension payment in period 
2 (starting with E[Y(∆p)] = w1 ⋅ ϑ), while a negative demographic shock will 
lead to a proportional pension increase.
13 We set ϑ  to 0.15. The severity of the 
change in the pension payment for a given demographic shock ϕ is determined 
by αY. Depending on whether or not Y reacts to the demographic shock, we set 
αY  to 1 or 0, respectively. 
 
Figure 1 summarizes the endogenous dependencies in the model. The vari-
ables and parameters used and their base calibration are summarized in   
Table 3. 
 
demographic
shock ∆p
government
pension income Y risky return R
insurer ruin
probability d
effective annuity
payment L
 
Fig. 1 Summary of model dependencies 
 
 
                                                 
13  See footnote 1.  
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Table 3 Summary of variables and parameters, and their calibration 
 
symbol variable/parameter value/specification 
Α  actuarially fair survival payment see  Equation  (3) 
αY  reaction parameter of government 
pension w.r.t. demographic shock 
{0, 1} 
β  subjective discount factor  0.95 
ci  consumption in period i decision  variable 
d  insurer’s ruin probability  E[d(R, ∆p)] = 0.01 
δ  one-period deflator  1/1.0263 
γ  parameter of relative risk aversion  3 
L  effective annuity payment  see Equation (4) 
λ  annuity loading factor  0.9 
∆p  demographic shock  see Table 1 
p  survival probability  p0 + ∆p 
p0  mean survival probability  0.85 
π  annuity premium  decision variable 
ψ  default pay-off fraction  {0, 0.6} 
R  risky return  see Table 2 
rf  risk free return  1.05 
S  total savings  sR + sf + π 
sf  risk free investment  decision variable 
sR  risky investment  decision variable 
ϑ  government pension factor  0.15 
u  one-period utility function  CRRA 
w1  initial  wealth        100 
Y  government pension payment  see Equation (9) 
 
 
1.3 Solving Technique 
 
We performed the optimization of Objective (7) by using the 
MATHEMATICA® 5.1 implemented nonlinear optimizer NMaximize. To 
keep the optimization problem tractable, we discretized the risky return den-
sity function using Gaussian quadrature method as done, e.g., by Cocco, 
Gomes, and Maenhout (2005). 
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2 Results 
 
As the introduction and model sections of this paper made clear, our model 
incorporates complex dependencies between demographic risk, government 
pension payments, the insurer’s ruin probability, effective annuity payouts, 
and the performance of the risky asset. To gain insight into how demographic 
risk per se is perceived by an expected utility maximizer, in Section 2.1 we 
first analyze a situation where government pension payments, the risky return, 
and the insurer’s ruin probability do not depend on demographic risk. After 
this, in Section 2.2.1, we investigate the situation including all dependencies 
illustrated by Figure 1, but neglecting for the moment the possibility of a de-
pendency between demographic risk and the performance of the risky asset 
(asset meltdown). Since this kind of dependency has generated some contro-
versy in the scientific literature (see, e.g., Abel, 2001, 2003; Poterba, 2001; 
Brooks, 2002), we will analyze that case separately in Section 2.2.2. In Sec-
tion 2.3, the parameters used in our calibration are varied to generalize our 
results. In Section 2.4, we derive policy implications for potential insurance 
buyers as well as for the insurance industry and regulators. 
 
 
2.1 Demographic risk as an independent multiplicative background risk 
 
From the expected utility maximization Objective (7) it becomes apparent that 
a mean-preserving demographic risk does not influence the individual’s deci-
sions at all if 
 
(i)  government pension payments do not react to demographic develop-
ments (or the individual simply does not participate in such a pen-
sion scheme), 
(ii)  annuity providers—even if subject to default risk—appear to be im-
munized against demographic shocks with respect to their solvency 
situation, and 
(iii)  demographic shocks and the risky asset return are stochastically 
independent from each other. 
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If Conditions (i) to (iii) hold, the survival probability in Objective (7) can be 
simply evaluated separately via the expected value operator. In the case—and 
that is what we assumed—that E(p) = p0, Objective (7) has the same form and 
will lead to the same optimal consumption, saving, and asset allocation deci-
sions as it would if demographic risk did not exist at all. The individual thus 
behaves risk neutrally toward this intertemporal risk. In fact, for the individ-
ual, the risk of having used the wrong total discount factor β · p when deter-
mining optimal decisions (and thus, e.g., to have consumed too much if his 
survival probability turns out to go up) does not matter at all. In other words, 
the mere existence of demographic risk does not produce any wish for risk 
protection and thus does not influence the individual’s annuity demand. Al-
though at first this result seems surprising, it is, in fact, a standard implication 
of the individual’s assumed preference structure, as analyzed in other contexts 
by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976); Gollier (2001, chapter 19); Franke, 
Schlesinger, and Stapleton (2005, 2005a).
14 
 
Even if the shock was not mean preserving but only symmetric around some 
mean deviation (or trend), it would have the effect of a change in discounting 
tomorrow’s consumption, rather than the effect of an (additive) background 
risk: the presence of a background risk generally reduces risky investment 
(Kimball, 1993) and increases insurance demand (Eeckhoudt, and Kimball, 
1992). As, on the contrary, a change in discounting for additively separable 
CRRA utility evaluation does not influence asset allocation (see Gollier, 2001, 
chapter 19), the introduction of demographic risk in the manner considered so 
far does not influence investment and insurance purchasing decisions. 
 
The individual’s risk-neutral perception of demographic risk changes as soon 
as at least one of the three conditions (i) to (iii) above does not hold. In what 
follows, we will study the impacts of first dropping Conditions (i) and (ii), and 
then look at the effect of dropping all three conditions. 
 
 
                                                 
14  Note that for these results, it is not necessary that the insurer’s ruin probability is also 
stochastically independent from the risky asset return R.  
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2.2  A first analysis of the model with dependencies 
 
2.2.1 The insurer’s ruin probability depends on demographic risk and the 
risky return; government pension payments depend on demographic risk 
 
We now assume that the insurer’s ruin probability depends on demographic 
risk and the risky return. Furthermore, government pension payments also de-
pend on demographic risk. Here, demographic risk becomes a sticky risk. In 
states of nature where the survival probability increases due to a demographic 
shock, the government pension system performs poorly and the insurer’s ruin 
probability increases, i.e., there is a higher probability that the annuity will 
also perform poorly. To complete the distress, exactly those cases are weighed 
more heavily within the expected utility evaluation (see Objective (7)). On the 
one hand, this occurs because for those cases the survival probability, i.e., the 
weight in the expected utility evaluation, is high. On the other hand, due to the 
concavity of u, the insurer’s worsening solvency situation when survival prob-
ability increases is perceived more badly than a reduction in the insurer’s ruin 
probability (when the survival probability decreases) is appreciated. For high 
values of the default pay-off fraction ψ (and low values of αY), these effects 
are somewhat alleviated, since the annuity payout (and government pension 
payout) reacts less to demographic risk. Thus, both parameters indicate the 
stickiness of demographic risk. 
 
The annuity demand reaction function with respect to the strength of demo-
graphic risk—henceforth abbreviated by ADRF—is shown in Figure 2 for a 
default pay-off fraction of ψ = 0.6. 
  
 
 
 
18
30.08
30.12
30.16
30.20
30.24
30.28
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
Pr[∆p  = 0]
π
(
 
—
—
 
)
75.8%
75.9%
76.0%
76.1%
76.2%
76.3%
π
 
/
 
S
 
(
 
.
.
.
.
.
.
 
)
 
 
Fig. 2 Annuity demand π and annuity demand in proportion to total savings 
π / S dependent on Pr[∆p = 0], i.e., the probability that the demographic shock 
is 0 (ADRF); default pay-off fraction ψ = 0.6 
 
Figure 2 illustrates that insurance demand increases in absolute terms and also 
in proportion to total savings with the strength of demographic risk, i.e., with 
decreasing probability that the demographic shock is 0.
15 This increase in 
insurance demand as demographic risk increases is the reaction one would 
intuitively expect: higher risk is accompanied by higher insurance demand. 
The actual causal mechanisms leading to such positively sloped ADRF, how-
ever, are rather complex. 
 
As demonstrated in Section 2.1, the individual has no incentive to protect him-
self against demographic risk per se, for example, by buying annuities. Fur-
thermore, due to the additional dependency between the insurer’s ruin prob-
                                                 
15  Total savings decrease slightly with increasing demographic risk. This is the normal (pru-
dent) reaction of a CRRA investor to an increase in background risk (see Deaton, 1991; 
Elmendorf and Kimball, 2000). The tendency of annuity demand reaction w.r.t demo-
graphic risk is in absolute terms and relative terms equal. In the remainder of this paper, 
we show only relative values, i.e., portfolio shares.  
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ability, annuity default, and demographic risk, an annuity cannot be used to 
fully hedge against this risk. Things have to be different. Government pension 
payments negatively depend on the realization of the demographic shock. 
Demographic risk thus increases the background risk stemming from the gov-
ernment pension system and therefore increases the individual’s wish to create 
a safer asset allocation (cp. Kimball, 1993; Elmendorf and Kimball, 2000). To 
do this, the individual shifts savings out of the risky asset, as illustrated in Fig-
ure 3. In deciding where the assets should be shifted to, the individual com-
pares the specific payment characteristics of the risk free asset and the annuity. 
If the annuity is risk free itself (and not loaded too heavily), it will clearly 
dominate the risk free asset due to the inherent mortality premium on top of 
the risk free return (see, e.g., Brown, 2001). However, if the annuity becomes 
risky, the choice now depends on a comparison between the situation-depend-
ent certainty equivalent of the annuity and the risk free investment. If the de-
fault pay-off fraction ψ is high, this comparison will favor the annuity leading 
to a zero demand for the risk free investment. 
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Fig. 3 Risky investment in proportion to total savings sR / S dependent on 
Pr[∆p = 0], i.e., the probability that the demographic shock is 0; default pay-
off fraction ψ = 0.6  
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If the default pay-off fraction ψ of the annuity shrinks, the risk free investment 
becomes comparatively more attractive, and finally, it will be used for saving. 
This is the case in Figure 4, where ψ is 0; i.e., in the case of the insurer’s ruin, 
the individual receives no payment at all from the annuity.
16 
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Fig. 4 Annuity, risky, and risk free investment in proportion to total savings S 
dependent on Pr[∆p = 0], i.e., the probability that the demographic shock is 0; 
default pay-off fraction ψ = 0 
 
ADRF now decreases with increasing demographic risk.
17 Moving from 
Pr[∆p = 0] = 1  to  Pr[∆p  =  0]  =  0.95, i.e., introducing demographic risk, the 
emerging (government pension) background risk induces the individual to re-
duce annuity demand and to shift savings into the risky asset, which now, for 
ψ = 0, appears to be the less risky investment opportunity (for ψ = 0.6, this 
shift did not take place; see Figure 2). In this demographic probability model, 
                                                 
16   This extreme case is what Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Wakker, Thaler, and 
Tversky (1997) called probabilistic insurance. 
17  This reaction by the individual to demographic risk can be observed for ψ < 0.2. Inside 
the interval 0.2 ≤ ψ ≤ 0.3, the slope of ADRF reverses by changing its shape from a 
decreasing function to a parabola, and from there (0.3 < ψ ) to an increasing function.  
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the risk free investment is still not attractive enough (or, in other words, the 
background risk is not severe enough) to induce risk free savings. In fact, the 
individual would even go into debt, if the borrowing constraint did not keep 
him from doing so. 
 
For lower values of Pr[∆p = 0], higher demographic risk or, to be more pre-
cise, the increased background risk, now creates a situation where any portfo-
lio of annuity and the risky asset alone is too risky for the individual. He be-
gins to shift savings away from annuities and the risky investment into the risk 
free investment, which means that, due to the high systematicness of demo-
graphic risk, ADRF now decreases. Note that this decrease is lower in the re-
gion where the borrowing constraint is binding, which can be explained as 
follows. The slope of the ADRF in the region where the borrowing constraint 
is nonbinding can be seen as the individual’s “normal” reaction to demo-
graphic risk. If there was no borrowing constraint, for Pr[∆p = 0] ≥ 0.95 the 
individual would go into debt. However, as this is not possible, the individual 
seeks another way to get some risk into his portfolio. One way is to become 
more tolerant toward demographic risk, leading to a less strong reaction to 
demographic risk in the constrained regions. 
 
Comparing the annuity demand shown in Figures 2 and 4 it is apparent that a 
reduction in the default pay-off fraction ψ does not only reverse the portfolio 
decisions for different strengths of demographic risk. Also, given a certain 
value of Pr[∆p = 0], a decrease in the default pay-off fraction ψ leads to a re-
duction in annuity demand, which is the normal reaction: a reduction of ψ 
neither changes the expected value of the return from the annuity nor its actu-
arial fairness (see Equations (2) and (3)). However, it makes the return more 
volatile, increases the interval of possible effective payments, and increases 
the annuity’s exposure to demographic risk (thus also increasing the positive 
dependence on the government pension payment; see Equation (4)). Due to 
risk aversion and the prudence feature of u, this results in a lower annuity de-
mand (cp. Kimball, 1993; Elmendorf and Kimball, 2000). 
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2.2.2 The insurer’s ruin probability depends on demographic risk and the 
risky return; government pension payments depend on demographic risk; 
the risky return depends on demographic risk (asset meltdown) 
 
We now introduce the asset meltdown hypothesis into the model. So far, the 
two systematic risks (demographic and asset return risk) have been assumed to 
be stochastically independent from each other. The asset meltdown hypothesis 
now links demographic risk and the return of the risky asset directly, in a way 
that a combination of both risks becomes more undesirable to the individual 
(cp. Table 2). Furthermore, if the individual decides to hold the risky asset, 
government pension payments also become riskier because the dependency 
between demographic risk and the return of the risky asset implicitly links 
government pension payments to the performance of the risky asset (see Fig-
ure 1). Finally, an asset meltdown increases the stickiness of demographic 
risk, since the states of nature that are weighed more heavily in the expected 
utility evaluation (increases in the survival probability) are accompanied by 
rather poor returns from the risky asset. 
 
Consequently, the tendencies shown in Figures 2 and 4 in Section 2.2.1 be-
come more strongly pronounced when the asset meltdown hypothesis is intro-
duced. Figure 5 shows ADRF for the case of a default pay-off fraction ψ = 0.6. 
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Fig. 5 Annuity demand in proportion to total savings S dependent on 
Pr[∆p = 0], i.e., the probability that the demographic shock is 0 (ADRF); de-
fault pay-off fraction ψ = 0.6 
 
The additional dependence of both the risky asset and the government pension 
payments on the performance of the risky asset return leads—when ψ is 
high—to a higher demand for the comparatively safe risky asset: the annuity 
(cp. Viceira, 2001; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005). This occurs because 
the just introduced dependence in the first instance disturbs the pay-off char-
acteristics of the risky asset. As the annuity was also previously (in Section 
2.2.1) linked to both demographic and risky return risk, the new dependence 
affects the (for ψ high, in any case rather safe) annuity only slightly. 
 
If the annuity becomes increasingly risky as ψ decreases, ADRF goes down 
(shown in Figure 6) and, as before (see Figure 4), the individual shifts some of 
his wealth into the risk free asset (not shown here). As above, the effects, 
having led to a decreasing ADRF as shown in Figure 4, are intensified by in-
troducing the asset meltdown. 
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Fig. 6 Annuity demand in proportion to total savings S dependent on 
Pr[∆p = 0], i.e., the probability that the demographic shock is 0 (ADRF); de-
fault pay-off fraction ψ = 0 
 
Figures 5 and 6 also contain the independence case, discussed in Section 2.1, 
where annuity demand did not react at all to demographic risk. The fact that—
compared to this case—annuity demand increases (decreases) for higher 
(lower) values of the default pay-off fraction ψ underlines the arguments made 
above. For higher values of ψ (Figure 5), the individual reacts to the increase 
in risk stemming from the introduction of dependencies by shifting savings 
from the risky asset to the comparatively less risky annuity. For lower values 
of ψ, again, the reaction is the opposite—ADRF becomes negatively sloped 
(see Figure 6). 
 
 
2.3 A deeper analysis of the impacts of model parameters on ADRF 
 
The numerical examples set out in Section 2.2 revealed that there are several 
influences that must be considered regarding an individual’s annuity demand 
reaction w.r.t. demographic risk (ADRF). In particular, we observed that  
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ADRF may have a negative or positive slope, i.e., in some situations the indi-
vidual reacts to increasing demographic risk by increasing, in other cases by 
decreasing, the portfolio share of annuities. The sign of the slope of ADRF 
appears to be controlled by the default fraction pay-off parameter ψ. In what 
follows we provide a deeper analysis of the mechanisms driving our model. 
 
When we vary the parameters γ, β, λ, p0, αY, the strength of the demographic 
shock, the strength of the mean return shift in the case of an asset meltdown, 
and ϑ, we observe fundamental differences in parameter influence: some pa-
rameters (γ  and β ) control only the intensity of the individual’s reaction to 
demographic risk, i.e., the magnitude of the slope of ADRF, whereas other 
parameters (ψ, λ, p0, αY, the strength of the demographic shock, the strength of 
the mean return shift in the case of an asset meltdown, and ϑ ) also control the 
direction of the individual’s reaction, i.e., the sign of the slope of ADRF. 
Moreover, emphasizing our results of Section 2.2, it turns out that whether or 
not the borrowing constraint, sf ≥ 0, is binding is also a factor that influences 
the magnitude of the slope (but not the sign) of ADRF. 
 
In the following, we discuss these influences in detail. We start in Section 
2.3.1 with parameters that do not influence the sign of the slope of ADRF, 
next, in Section 2.3.2, we examine other parameters that are able to change the 
sign of the slope of ADRF. Section 2.3.3 contains general conclusions from 
the preceding sections. 
 
 
2.3.1 Parameters influencing only the magnitude of the slope of ADRF 
 
An increase in the relative risk aversion parameter γ generally leads to a safer 
asset allocation (see Gollier, 2001, chapter 4). From the discussion of Figures 
2 and 4 in Section 2.2.1, we know that the most important factors influencing 
how the individual will achieve this increased safety are, first, whether the 
annuity is rather safe (ψ high) or not (ψ low) and, if ψ is low, second, whether 
the borrowing constraint is binding or not. 
 
If ψ is rather high (increasing ADRF) and thus the annuity appears to be more 
attractive than the risk free asset, increased desire for a safe asset allocation  
 
 
 
26
will lead to an even stronger shift out of the risky asset into the (safer) annuity 
than for a lower γ. The increasing ADRF becomes steeper. In the case where ψ 
is rather low (decreasing ADRF) and the borrowing constraint is binding, our 
discussion of Figure 4 showed that the individual develops some risk tolerance 
toward demographic risk. As risk aversion goes up, however, the individual’s 
level of additional risk tolerance becomes much more sensitive to an increase 
in demographic risk. Thus, the individual will react more strongly to increas-
ing demographic risk: the falling ADRF becomes steeper. 
 
Only when the borrowing constraint is nonbinding, and the individual is per-
mitted to act freely in the face of increasing demographic risk, we find a de-
crease in reaction intensity. For a higher γ, the individual invests a greater 
amount in the risk free asset and chooses a lower exposure to demographic 
risk (via purchasing annuities) than if γ is low. Due to his lower exposure, the 
individual’s adjustments to the annuity share of the portfolio will be less pro-
nounced than for lower γ. Thus ADRF becomes flatter. 
 
The influence of the subjective discount factor β on the optimal decisions de-
pends on whether the individual receives government pension income. Gener-
ally, an increase in the subjective discount factor β  leads to higher total sav-
ings since the individual puts a larger weight on future consumption. If gov-
ernment pension income is 0 (ϑ = 0), the individual’s asset allocation is inde-
pendent of β for CRRA utility.
18 If the individual does receive pension income 
(ϑ > 0), the pension income works to some extent as a substitute for risk free 
savings (see, e.g., Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2005). Higher total savings 
due to an increase in β naturally lead to an increase in the relation of total 
savings to pension income. This relative reduction of a risk free position in-
duces the individual to choose a safer asset allocation for his savings or, in 
other words, the individual acts more risk averse. Thus, the effects of an in-
crease in β on the slope of ADRF are the same as in the case of an increase in 
γ. Table 4 summarizes the results of this subsection. 
 
                                                 
18  Here, asset allocation is shown to be myopic (see, e.g., Gollier, 2001, chapter 19).  
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Table 4 Influence of variation of model input parameters on ADRF 
 
magnitude of absolute slope of ADRF 
when borrowing constraint 
influence of increase in does not bind   binds 
relative risk aversion γ  ↓  ↑ 
subjective discount factor β 
(for ϑ > 0)
↓  ↑ 
 
 
2.3.2 Parameters influencing the sign of the slope of ADRF 
 
Whereas γ  and β  control behavior in a given risk situation, the parameters 
ψ, λ, p0, αY, the strength of the demographic shock, the strength of the mean 
return shift in the case of an asset meltdown, and ϑ  control the risk situation 
itself, thus leading to changes in the way the individual reacts to demographic 
risk, i.e., the sign of the slope of ADRF. At this, it turns out that only for 
variations in ϑ , the strength of the mean return shift in case of the asset melt-
down, and ψ it is of importance, whether the borrowing constraint is binding 
or not. 
 
A decrease in the loading factor λ, i.e., an increase in the premium load-
ing, leads to a proportional drop in annuity payments for a given annuity pre-
mium, which makes the annuity—compared to alternative investment oppor-
tunities—less attractive in all states of nature. Annuity demand shrinks (see, 
e.g., Mitchell et al., 1999; Brown and Poterba, 2000). An increase in the vola-
tility of effective annuity payouts with increasing demographic risk is now 
penalized more heavily. If the slope of ADRF already has a negative sign 
(compare Figure 2), a decrease in λ makes ADRF even steeper. The slope of a 
positive ADRF (compare Figure 4) becomes flatter; with increasing demo-
graphic risk, the individual more reluctantly shifts savings to the now less at-
tractive annuity. If the annuity actuarially becomes too unfair, the slope of 
ADRF will even reverse and become negative. Thus a decrease in λ turns 
ADRF clockwise. 
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Varying the mean survival probability p0 creates two effects: on the one hand, 
from Objective (7) it follows that an increase in p0 is equivalent to an increase 
in the mean “overall” discount rate β · p0, which leads to the same tendencies 
as in the case of an increase in β. On the other hand, from Equation (3) it fol-
lows that an increase in p0 leads to a drop in the mortality credit of the annuity. 
Thus the expected return from the annuity shrinks in a way similar to the case 
of a decrease in λ. Again, in all states of nature the annuity becomes less at-
tractive compared to alternative investment opportunities, and annuity demand 
decreases (see, e.g., Mitchell et al., 1999; Brown and Poterba, 2000). In our 
calibration, the second effect dominates the first, and thus an increase of p0 
leads to the same (although more moderate) tendencies as a decrease in λ. 
 
Note that, as discussed in Section 2.1, if the demographic shock instead of 
being mean-preserving is only symmetric around some mean shift in survival 
probability, this can be decomposed into a deterministic increase in p0 and a 
mean preserving shock. An additional assumption of a trend in changes in sur-
vival probability would thus have the same effect as an increase in the mean 
survival probability p0. 
 
An increase in the reaction parameter of government pensions w.r.t. demo-
graphic shocks, αY, makes government pension payments more volatile, i.e., 
background risk and the stickiness of demographic risk increase. Since effec-
tive annuity payouts are positively correlated with government pension pay-
ments, the annuity becomes less attractive relative to other (uncorrelated) as-
sets, similar to what happens in the case of a decrease in λ. Consequently, the 
tendency of change in the slope of annuity demand curves is the same as in the 
case of a decrease of λ. 
 
An increase in the strength of the demographic shock (in the base case it was 
set to ± 0.01) also leads to an increase in background risk and makes the 
stickiness of demographic risk more pronounced, since bad states of nature are 
weighed even more heavily in the expected utility evaluation. Thus an increase 
in the strength of the demographic shock leads to the same tendencies as an 
increase in αY, although they will be more pronounced. 
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Increases in the strength of the mean return shift in the case of an asset melt-
down make the link between the risky asset and demographic risk even more 
risky to the individual. Here, the effect on the ADRF depends on whether the 
borrowing constraint is binding. If the borrowing constraint binds, i.e., if the 
individual perceives the annuity as a rather favorable, safe investment, the in-
dividual reacts to stronger demographic risk by reducing the risky position in 
favor of the annuity; ADRF turns counterclockwise (compare Figure 5). If the 
borrowing constraint does not bind, the individual increases his risk free posi-
tion in disfavor of the annuity. The stronger the demographic risk and mean 
return shift, the more likely he will be to transfer assets in this manner; ADRF 
turns clockwise (compare Figure 6).
19 
 
As discussed in Section 2.2, also the default pay-off fraction ψ is important for 
the sign of the slope of ADRF. This parameter’s influence on ADRF depends 
on whether or not the borrowing constraint binds. For low ψ, the annuity is a 
rather risky asset. The risk free asset is attractive enough so that the borrowing 
constraint does not bind and positive risk free savings are induced. ADRF was 
shown to have a negative slope. Increasing ψ here leads to a steeper ADRF; it 
turns clockwise. Although the risk return tradeoff of the annuity improves, the 
individual is less willing to hold this asset as demographic risk increases be-
cause where ψ is low, demographic risk—when it occurs—has a stronger im-
pact on the individual. When increasing ψ at a low level, the risk exposure of 
the annuity remains high. Nevertheless, especially for Pr[∆p = 0] = 1, the indi-
vidual increases the amount in the annuity with increasing ψ due to the better 
risk return tradeoff. However, since the individual is now more invested in the 
annuity in the first place,
20 he reacts more sensitively to the introduction of 
demographic risk. If demographic risk is introduced, i.e., Pr[∆p = 0] < 1, the 
higher but nevertheless still low ψ is not enough to overcome the individual’s 
fear of demographic risk. This changes as soon as ψ takes values high enough 
                                                 
19  The ADRF turning tendencies observed here do also hold for “asset meltups”, i.e., for the 
case of a positive dependency between ∆p and R. Such dependency may result from 
changes in saving behavior due to demographic shocks. For example, if survival 
probability rises, younger investors will save more to cope with their now increased 
expected life-span, whereas older investors will decumulate their assets more slowly. 
Both effects may lead to increases in asset prices, see, e.g. Poterba (2001). 
20  An increase in annuity demand due to an increasing default pay-off fraction is consistent 
with the results of Babbel and Merrill (2006).  
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to dominate the risk free asset, i.e., to make the borrowing restriction bind. 
With increasing ψ, ADRF turns counterclockwise until, eventually, the sign of 
its slope becomes positive (see Figure 2). 
 
An increase in the government pension income factor ϑ  (see Equation (9)) 
means, on the one hand, an increase in the individual’s exposure to demo-
graphic risk. On the other hand, it also means an increase in the individual’s 
risk free income position. As a consequence, the effects of variations in the 
parameterϑ on ADRF are less clear-cut. Here, the value of the default-payoff 
fraction parameter ψ, i.e., the systematic exposure of the annuity to demo-
graphic risk, and the binding or nonbinding nature of the borrowing constraint, 
are of great importance. For high ψ, we observed the following general ten-
dency: an increase in government pension factor ϑ and the thus induced in-
crease in the individual’s exposure to demographic risk turns the positively 
sloped ADRF clockwise until it finally becomes negatively sloped. For low ψ, 
ADRF stays negatively sloped, but the complex interplay of the factors men-
tioned above leads to different turning directions depending on the specific 
value of ϑ. A thorough analysis of this interplay is provided in the Appendix. 
 
The influence on ADRF of variations in model input parameters as discussed 
in this section is summarized in Table 4.
21 
 
                                                 
21  We tested the validity of our results by using several thousand numerical examples.  
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Table 4 Influence on ADRF of variation in model input parameters 
 
turning direction of ADRF when borrowing 
constraint 
influence of increase in does not bind  binds 
loading factor λ  4  4 
mean survival probability p0 3  3 
reaction of government pensions 
w.r.t. demographic shocks αY
3  3 
strength of demographic shock  3  3 
strength of mean return shift in 
the case of an asset meltdown 3  4 
default pay-off fraction ψ 3  4 
government pension income 
factor ϑ  given a low ψ 3   4  4   3 
government pension income 
factor ϑ  given a high ψ 3  3 
 
 
2.3.3 Conclusions from section results 
 
The analyses provided in Sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 showed that model parame-
ters can be classified into two groups: those parameters influencing the indi-
vidual’s risk perception (γ  and β) and those that influence the risk situation 
itself (ψ, λ, p0, αY, the strength of the demographic shock, the strength of the 
mean return shift in the case of an asset meltdown, and ϑ). While the parame-
ters from the first group, which are all subjective (preference) parameters, de-
termine only the intensity of the individual’s reaction to demographic risk, the 
parameters from the second group, which are all objective parameters, also 
influence the direction of the annuity demand reaction to demographic risk. In 
the numerical examples presented in Section 2.2, we demonstrated this by 
varying ψ in such a way that in one case (ψ = 0.6), the annuity was perceived 
as being rather safe, while in the other case (ψ = 0), the annuity was perceived 
as rather risky due to its exposure to the systematic risks. As we have seen, the 
sign of the slopes of the individual’s respective ADRF changed. From the 
analyses in Section 2.3.2, we now know that this result also would occur if we 
vary one (or more) of the other parameters of the second group (i.e., parame- 
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ters influencing the risk situation) such that the individual’s exposure to sys-
tematic risks in general, and to demographic risk in particular, is increased. 
Any constellation of objective parameters thus create a risk situation deter-
mining the sign of the slope of the individual’s ADRF. The intensity of reac-
tion within this risk setting is then only fine-tuned by the individual’s subjec-
tive risk perception parameters. That means that even if ψ is rather high, a 
high value of the government pension reaction parameter αY can lead to a 
negatively sloped ADRF. Such a turn in ADRF cannot be achieved by in-
creases in γ or β  within their domains. 
 
 
2.4 Policy implications 
 
A first and important implication of our results is that demographic risk, per 
se, does not increase the demand for annuities. It rather depends on the riski-
ness of the whole situation (or more exactly: the stochastic dependencies with 
demographic shocks) in which potential insurance buyers decide how much of 
their wealth they are willing to annuitize. Parameters influencing this risk 
situation can be: 
 
  individual specific (e.g., claims on the government pension system, or 
the expected survival probability); 
  valid for all potential insurance buyers (e.g., the extent to which 
systematic insurance defaults can be absorbed, or in how far asset re-
turns and/or the stability of the government pension system is exposed 
to demographic shocks); and 
  controllable by the insurer (e.g., exposure to systematic risks or choice 
of premium loadings). 
 
All the objective parameters together determine whether a potential insurance 
buyer will react with an increased or decreased demand for annuities when 
new information on the characteristics of demographic risk becomes available, 
e.g., by the publication of a new study in this field. Regarding this, it is not 
only the expected trend of future development in mortality, but also the preci-
sion of the survival probability forecasts (with respect to both the extent and 
the probability of possible deviations) that are of importance.  
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People whose (future) government pension income is very high compared to 
present wealth already have a high exposure to demographic risk. For these 
people, annuities become less attractive with increasing demographic risk, 
even if the guarantee fund is working quite well and the insurer itself provides 
a robust solvency situation. For other potential insurance buyers who have a 
rather low or no government pension income, also at lower degrees of safety 
of the whole risk situation, higher uncertainty about future mortality can even 
result in an increase in annuity demand. 
 
Since we have seen that implementing the consideration of demographic risk 
into individual decision making may result in both decreases and increases in 
annuity demand, our results may both alleviate, but also intensify, the annuity 
puzzle. In any case, potential insurance buyers should check their demo-
graphic risk exposure when making an annuity purchasing decision. For such a 
decision, the direction of their demand reaction does not depend on their sub-
jective risk perception characteristics. 
 
When considering the specific market situation (e.g., the characteristics of 
potential insurance buyers) and additionally the costs that will accompany the 
actions taken, our model can help the insurance industry answer the following 
questions: 
 
  How can strategic decisions with respect to premium policy, or meas-
ures that aim at decreasing idiosyncratic (via asset liability manage-
ment) or systematic risk exposure (via financing guarantee funds), 
stimulate annuity demand in dependence of the severity of demo-
graphic risk? 
  How will increased research activity with respect to the actual changes 
in mortality rates and public awareness of demographic risk lead to an 
increase or a decrease in annuity demand? 
  What will be the consequences for the annuity business if the asset 
meltdown hypothesis turns out to be true? 
  Can combinations of annuities with mortality derivatives aimed at 
reducing the annuities’ vulnerability to demographic risk stimulate an-
nuity demand? 
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For the field of insurance regulation, our model illustrates that the ruin prob-
ability alone is not sufficient to describe and control an insurer’s solvency 
situation (see also Butsic, 1994; Wang, 1998). Additional measures, such as 
expected policyholder deficit or the tail value at risk, should be considered.
22 
 
 
3 Summary and Directions of Further Research 
 
In this contribution, we studied the impact of uncertainty about future mortal-
ity developments (demographic risk) on individuals’ annuity demand. Within 
an intertemporal expected utility maximization framework, we showed that 
demographic risk does not influence annuity purchasing decisions if it is sto-
chastically independent from all other sources of income risk. However, for 
most potential insurance buyers, this condition does not hold. Rather, demo-
graphic risk appears to be a very sticky risk, i.e., it is hardly transferable. We 
showed that whether the existence of demographic risk will lead to an increase 
or a decrease in individuals’ annuity demand is determined by objective fac-
tors (such as the exposure of the government pension system and/or the insur-
ance industry with respect to demographic shocks) and not by subjective fac-
tors (such as individual risk aversion). Subjective factors determine only the 
intensity of the annuity demand reaction to demographic risk. Our results 
show that consideration of demographic risk may both alleviate, but also in-
tensify, the annuity puzzle. 
 
As a model extension, bequest motives together with the additional possibility 
to buy term life insurance contracts could be incorporated into the model 
leading to a certain hedging opportunity for the individual. Due to the 
systematicness of demographic risk, however, this hedging opportunity at the 
same time may increase the individual's (and his heirs') exposure to 
demographic risk as, depending on the vulnerability of the insurer to 
demographic risk, annuities and term life contracts may default at the same 
time, once more emphasizing the stickiness of demographic risk. 
 
                                                 
22  The Swiss solvency regulation already uses such measures, see, e.g., Keller, Luder, and 
Stober (2005).  
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In a further step, the individual annuity demand model may be combined with 
a corporate model such as of Gründl, Post, and Schulze (2006). Within the 
arising game situation, the shareholder value maximizing insurer then would 
choose its optimal exposure to demographic and capital market risk. The 
resulting solvency situation of the insurer is then incorporated into the 
decision calculus of expected utility maximizing individuals deciding on their 
demand for annuities and/or term-insurances which again is an input 
parameter for the calculus of the insurer. The resulting equilibrium solution 
could provide valuable input for policymakers concerned with insurance 
regulation and the consequences of the privatization of retirement systems. 
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Appendix: Variations in the government pension income factor ϑ and 
their impact on ADRF 
 
For variations in the government pension income factor ϑ, the influence on 
ADRF is less clear-cut. Figure 7 contains the individual’s annuity demand re-
action to the strength of demographic risk for given values of ϑ. It plots the 
difference of the annuity share in the individual’s savings between the case 
where the probability of a zero demographic shock Pr[∆p  =  0] is 0.6 and 
where it is 1 against ϑ.
23 Negative values in Figure 7 thus indicate a negative 
sloped ADRF, and vice versa. 
 
                                                 
23  Thus we look on the left and right boundary of the abscissa of Figures 2 and 4. Other 
pairs of Pr[∆p = 0] delivered the same tendencies.  
 
 
 
40
-5.0%
-4.0%
-3.0%
-2.0%
-1.0%
0.0%
1.0%
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8
government pension factor ϑ
( π
 
/
 
S
 
|
 
P
r
[
∆
p
 
=
 
0
]
 
=
 
0
.
6
)
 
-
 
( π
 
/
 
S
 
|
 
P
r
[
∆
p
 
=
 
0
]
 
=
 
1
)
ψ = 0
ψ = 0.6
 
 
Fig. 7 Demographic risk induced changes in the annuity demand proportion of 
total savings S depending on the government pension income factor ϑ 
 
Here, the value of the default pay-off fraction parameter ψ is of great impor-
tance. Looking at the base calibration government pension income factor   
ϑ = 0.15 and the curve where ψ = 0.6, we see that the sign of the slope of 
ADRF is positive (the curve in Figure 7 takes positive values), which refers to 
the case shown in Figure 2. When moving to the right, i.e., increasing gov-
ernment pension income, the sign of the slope of ADRF reverses at about 
ϑ = 0.43 (the curve for ψ = 0.6 in Figure 7 takes negative values). That means, 
for higher ϑ (opposite to Figure 2), the higher the demographic risk, the less 
the individual invests in the annuity. For ϑ > 0.71, the curve is equal to 0. 
Here, the individual in both probability models does not buy any annuities 
(therefore, the difference in the portfolio shares is also 0). The large pension 
income crowds out private annuity demand (see, e.g., Mitchell et al., 1999; 
Brown and Poterba, 2000). The reason for the overall negative slope of the 
curve ψ = 0.6 in Figure 7 is the individual’s increasing exposure to demo-
graphic risk as ϑ increases. The positive stochastic dependence of the annuity 
and government pension income makes annuities less attractive the higher the 
individual’s government pension income is. At ϑ = 0.43, this effect becomes  
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so strong that the total risk situation—which so far was perceived by the indi-
vidual so safe that he reacted to demographic risk by an increase in annuity 
demand—now turns into a rather risky situation where demographic risk re-
duces annuity demand. ADRF turns clockwise. 
 
For low values of the default pay-off fraction ψ, e.g., for ψ = 0, in Figure 7, 
the sign of the slope of ADRF stays negative but the impact of an increase in 
government pension income is more complex. To understand the effects, in 
Figure 8, we additionally plotted the individual’s risk free investment. 
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Fig. 8 Risk free investment in proportion to total savings S dependent on the 
government pension factor ϑ; default pay-off fraction ψ = 0 
 
For very low values of ϑ (between 0 and about 0.15), increasing demographic 
risk leads to a sharp reduction in the annuity portfolio share, a reduction that 
becomes even more pronounced when ϑ increases (see Figure 7). The reason 
for this is the same as that given above: the annuity payment for ψ = 0 reacts 
very strongly to demographic risk and thus is strongly positively correlated 
with government pension income (this explains the highly negative value of 
the curve for very low values of ϑ). As ϑ increases (in between the interval   
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[0, 0.15]), the individual, on the one hand, reacts by reducing annuity demand 
more strongly with increasing demographic risk (which is due to the described 
higher exposure to demographic risk). This is the same effect we observed for 
increases in γ and β. On the other hand, the individual reduces the risk free in-
vestment (due to the higher absolute risk free income part in the government 
pension income payment). At one point, however, due to the borrowing con-
straint, no further reduction of the risk free investment is possible (see   
ϑ around 0.15 to 0.20 in Figures 7 and 8). This means that although the 
individual becomes less risk averse—due to the higher risk free part of the 
pension income—he cannot react by simply reducing his risk free investment. 
Instead, he wants to increase the riskiness of the remaining portfolio. In doing 
so, he becomes less sensitive to the positive correlation between annuity and 
pension income, leading to a weaker decrease in his demand curve with 
respect to demographic risk (the curve in Figure 7 becomes less negative; cp. 
also Section 2.2.1). This is what we previously observed for decreasing γ and 
β. This effect, however, is again caught up by the effect of the increasing 
exposure to demographic risk as ϑ increases. This again leads to a reversion of 
the curve in Figure 7, meaning that the individual again becomes more 
sensitive to the increasing positive correlation between annuity and pension 
income as demographic risk rises. For ϑ > 0.705, the individual reduces 
annuity demand to 0 for both demographic models. 
 